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H.W. v. GERMANY
MARK HAMBURGER
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the application of sub-paragraph (a) of
Article 5 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”). Specifically, the European Court of Human Rights
(“Court”) is asked to consider whether Mr. H.W.’s (“the applicant”)
preventive detention violated his right to liberty under Article 5 § 1
of the Convention.
A. Background
The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently being
detained in Berlin-Tegel Prison. In 1995, the Braunschweig District
Court convicted the applicant of attempted coercion and attempted
extortion of a fourteen-year-old girl and three counts of sexual abuse
of children by exhibitionist acts. The District Court sentenced him to
one year and three months imprisonment and granted him probation.
On November 26, 1997, the Berlin Regional Court convicted the
applicant on several grounds, including rape, sexual coercion, and
sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl and of two ten-year-old girls in
their apartments. For these offenses, the Regional Court sentenced
him to nine years and six months imprisonment with preventive
detention.
After consultation with a neurologic and psychiatric expert,
the Regional Court found that the applicant, who had confessed to
the offenses, had acted with full criminal responsibility, but suffered
from a dissocial and narcissistic personality disorder and a sexual
deviation that required therapeutic treatment. The report indicated
that he had a propensity to commit serious offenses, in particular
sexual offenses, and was therefore dangerous to the public.
On November 1, 2007, the Berlin Regional Court ordered the
execution of the preventive detention order against the applicant.

2

CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.

Vol. XIV

Relying on the psychiatric report from May 29, 1997, the court held
that the applicant was still dangerous to the public. Moreover, the
court held that the conclusions in the report were still valid because
the applicant’s personality and attitude exhibited no significant
changes. Also, while in prison, he had refused to attend therapy to
address his offenses.
On December 24, 2007, the applicant served his full sentence,
but since then he has been held in preventive detention in the BerlinTegel Prison.
B. Procedural History
On September 29, 2009, the applicant asked the Berlin Public
Prosecutor’s Office and the Berlin Regional Court to inform him of
the progress of his proceedings pursuant to Article 67e of the
Criminal Code. In this written request, he asked for review of
whether the further execution of the preventive detention order
against him was necessary. In his letter, he requested to have a
lawyer appointed to him and to consult an expert on his
dangerousness.
On November 9, 2009, the Berlin Regional Court asked the
Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office to obtain the information necessary
to conduct proper review proceedings. On November 11, 2009, the
Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office asked the Berlin-Tegel Prison
authority to make a statement on the applicant’s situation and
development in preventive detention. The request, however, was
never received. On December 2, 2009, the Public Prosecutor made a
second request for a statement, which was eventually received on
December 17, 2009.
On December 28, 2009, the Berlin-Tegel Prison authority
submitted its statement to the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office. The
statement recommended against suspending the execution of the
applicant’s preventive detention, citing to the applicant’s refusal to
attended therapy.
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On January 20, 2010, the Berlin Regional Court, after hearing
the applicant and his counsel, ordered the applicant’s preventive
detention to continue, dismissing his request to interrupt the
execution of that detention. Relying upon the applicant’s conduct in
prison and his written and oral statements, the Regional Court
concluded that he would likely reoffend if released. Moreover,
because of these facts, the Regional Court found it unnecessary to
consult a psychiatric expert on the applicant’s dangerousness.
On February 1, 2010, the applicant lodged an appeal against
the Regional Court’s decision. He argued that the Regional Court
failed to draw any consequences from the delays caused by the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, which extended the time limit for the
review of his preventive detention. On June 17, 2010, the Berlin
Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, affirming the
Regional Court’s finding that the applicant would likely commit
more unlawful acts upon his release.
The applicant, who was no longer represented by counsel,
subsequently filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal
Constitutional Court. He argued in particular, that his constitutional
right to liberty had been violated. Specifically, since December 24,
2009, there was no longer a legal basis for his preventive detention.
He further complained that the proceedings before the courts dealing
with the execution of his sentences had been unfair as the courts had
never sufficiently established the facts on which they had based their
conclusion that he was still dangerous to the public. In particular, he
argued that the 1997 expert report was out of date and thus
unreliable. Instead, a more recent expert report on his dangerousness
should have been obtained.
On September 16, 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court,
without explanation, declined to consider the applicant’s
constitutional complaint.
C. Domestic Law
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Under Article 66 of the Criminal Code, a sentencing court
may, at the time of an offender’s conviction, order his preventive
detention, known as a measure of correction and prevention, under
certain circumstances, if the offender has been shown to be
dangerous to the public.
Article 67d of the Criminal Code governs the duration of
preventive detention. Paragraph 2, first sentence, of that Article, in
its version in force at the relevant time, provides that if a maximum
duration is not established or if the time limit has not yet expired, the
court shall suspend on probation the further execution of the
detention order as soon as the offender is considered rehabilitated
and unlikely to commit any other unlawful acts on his or her release.
Under Article 67e of the Criminal Code, the court may
review at any time whether further execution of the preventive
detention order should be suspended and a measure of probation
applied or whether preventive detention should be terminated. The
court is obligated to do so within fixed time limits. For persons in
preventive detention, this time limit is two years.
Article 458 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that if objections are raised to the lawfulness of the execution of a
penalty, a court decision shall be obtained. The further execution of
the penalty shall not be suspended; the court may, however, order a
suspension of execution. Pursuant to Article 463 § 1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Article 458 applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
execution of measure of correction and prevention.
Under Article 463 § 3, third sentence, read in conjunction
with Article 454 § 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the courts
dealing with the execution of sentences have to consult an expert on
the convicted person’s dangerousness in proceedings under Article
67d 2 of the Criminal Code.
D. European Convention on Human Rights
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant,
reads as follows:
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1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court;
II. DISCUSSION
The Court’s discussion is broken down into two sections. The
first section concerns whether the Regional Court’s failure to comply
with the two-year time limit laid down in Article 67e of the Criminal
Code had breached the applicant’s right to liberty under Article 5 § 1
of the Convention. The second section addresses the Court’s analysis
of whether it was unlawful to continue the applicant’s preventive
detention without ordering a new psychiatric expert report that
evaluated his dangerousness to the public.
A. Court’s Assessment of the Alleged Violation of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention on Account of Non-Compliance with the Time Limit for
Judicial Review
Beginning with the first issue, the Court remarked,
“[c]ompliance with the rules of national law primarily requires any
arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law but also
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the
rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention.”
The Court interpreted “quality of the law” to mean that where a
national law authorizes deprivation of liberty, it must be “sufficiently
accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to
avoid all risk of arbitrariness.” Therefore, under the Convention,
compliance with national law is not sufficient. Rather, Article 5 § 1
of the Convention requires that any deprivation of liberty should be
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in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from
arbitrariness.
One of the factors the Court considers when assessing
whether a person’s detention is arbitrary for purposes of Article 5 § 1
is “the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a detention
order which had either expired or had been found to be defective.” In
this respect, the Court referenced two cases where review of the
applicants’ detention order had been delayed for eighty-two days and
nine and a half months, respectively. In both cases, the judges ruled
that the applicants’ liberty rights had been violated. In contrast, other
case rulings stated that a delay in the replacement of a detention
order lasting two weeks in one case and one month in another did not
violate the applicants’ liberty interest under Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention.
In such preventive detention cases, the court has also
previously examined the following factors when assessing whether a
person’s detention must be considered arbitrary for the purposes of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention: (1) whether adequate safeguards
existed to ensure the applicant’s release from detention would not be
unreasonable delayed; (2) whether the applicant contributed in any
way to the delays caused in the procedure; (3) whether the applicant
objected to a foreseeable delay in the proceedings; and (4) whether
the delay could be attributed to the complexity of the proceedings.
Before applying the factors to the case at hand, the Court
briefly analyzed the domestic court’s holding and concluded that
under domestic law, the applicant’s preventive detention following
December 24, 2009 was lawful. However, the Court quickly pointed
out that “national law must also be of a certain quality: it must
contain clear and accessible rules governing the circumstances in
which
deprivation
of
liberty
is
permissible.”
Thus,
“despite…compliance with domestic law,” a person’s detention may
still be arbitrary and thus contrary to Article 5 §1 of the Convention,
if the relevant factors weigh in favor of the applicant.
As such, the Court first examined the speed with which the
domestic courts replaced the expired detention order. The Court
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found that the delay of 27 days was not a negligible period of time.
Moreover, “a delay of almost one month is at the upper limit of what
it could still consider as reasonable, depending on all the
circumstances.”
Next, the Court concluded that the applicant cannot be said to
have contributed to delays in the review procedure. As evidence of
this, the Court noted the applicant’s ongoing inquiries about the
progress of his review proceedings prior to the expiration of the twoyear limit. On the contrary, the Court found that the delays “in the
review proceedings were mainly caused by the fact that the Berlin
Regional Court…initiated the review proceedings belatedly, only
some six weeks before the expiry of the statutory time-limit for
review.” Thereafter, “delays caused, in particular, by the fact that the
letter to the Berlin-Tegel Prison authority was lost, could no longer
be made up.” For these reasons, the Court ruled that the delays in the
procedure were not “caused by an unforeseeable complexity of the
proceedings,” but rather by mistakes made by the Public Prosecutor’s
office.
Finally, the Court found that there were no “sufficiently clear
safeguards to ensure that a decision on the applicant’s release from
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.” In this respect, the
Court emphasized the applicant’s lack of contribution to the delays.
Moreover, “the threshold applied by the domestic courts, which
examined whether the procedure followed in the review proceedings
disclosed a ‘flagrant irregularity,’ was too high and thus failed to
afford the applicant sufficient protection from excessive delays.” As
a final remark, the Court noted “the lack of adequate safeguards was
once again demonstrated by the fact that the time limit under Article
67e…was once again exceeded – by some two months – in the fresh
review proceedings following those at issue in the present case.”
Thus, the Court concluded that the applicant’s detention
between December 24, 2009 and January 20, 2010 was arbitrary and
thus unlawful for the purposes of Article 5 §1 of the Convention.
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B. Court’s Assessment of Alleged Violation of Article 5 §1 of the
Convention of the Convention for Failure to Obtain a Recent
Medical Expert Report
The Court also considered whether it was unlawful to
continue the applicant’s preventive detention without ordering a new
psychiatric expert report evaluating his dangerousness to the public.
The Court began by pointing out that “the word ‘after’ in subparagraph (a) does not simply mean that the ‘detention’ must follow
the ‘conviction’ in point of time.” Rather, “[t]here must be a
sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the
deprivation of liberty at issue.” This causal link may be broken if the
reasons for the applicant’s current detention are incompatible with
the grounds for his initial detention.
Thus, at issue here is how the reviewing court came to the
conclusion that the applicant was still dangerous to the public. It is
the applicant’s contention that the reviewing court made its decision
“without any recent expert report and on the basis of insufficient
reasons.” In this respect, the Court agreed with the applicant. The
Court considered “the only psychiatric expert report available to the
domestic courts examining whether the applicant was dangerous to
the public… was more than twelve and a half years old.” The Court
further stated that “[i]n such circumstances, a sufficient
establishment of the relevant facts concerning a person’s current
dangerousness, which resulted from personality disorders and a
sexual deviation and thus from a condition the persistence of which
is difficult to evaluate by persons without medical expertise, will, as
a rule, necessitate obtaining recent expert advice.”
Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the failure of
the domestic courts to at least attempt to obtain “fresh advice from an
external medical expert on the necessity of the applicant’s continuing
preventive detention” violated the applicant’s liberty rights under
Article 5 §1 of the Convention.
III. ANALYSIS
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The applicant alleged, “in particular, that the domestic courts’
failure to comply with the statutory time limit for review of the
necessity of his preventive detention and their refusal to consult a
medical expert on his dangerousness violated Article 5 §1 of the
Convention.”1 The following analysis will take a closer look at the
case law relied upon by the Court to support its holdings. It is my
contention that the Court misapplied the case law as to the first
holding, but properly applied it as to the second holding.
A. Revisiting Erkalo, Schönbrod, Rutten, and Winterwerp
Beginning with the first issue, the Court listed five factors
relevant in assessing whether a person’s detention must be
considered arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention:2 (1) the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a
detention order which had either expired or had been found
defective;3 (2) whether adequate safeguards existed to ensure that the
applicant’s release from detention would not be unreasonably
delayed;4 (3) whether the applicant contributed in any way to the
delays caused in the procedure;5 (4) whether the applicant objected to
a foreseeable delay in the proceedings;6 and (5) whether the delay
could be attributed to the complexity of the proceedings.7
Although no single factor is dispositive on the question of
whether a person’s detention must be considered arbitrary for
purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court in the present
1

H.W. v. Germany, App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int.
2
Id. ¶ 68-73.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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case, as well as in prior cases, gave more weight to the first two
factors.8 For this reason, this analysis, too, will emphasize the first
two factors, namely: (1) the speed with which the domestic courts
replaced a detention order which had either expired or had been
found defective; 9 and (2) whether there had been adequate
safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from detention
would not be unreasonably delayed.10
B. Erkalo v. The Netherlands
In Erkalo v. The Netherlands, review of the applicant’s
detention was delayed by eighty-two days.11 The applicant in Erkalo
had been convicted on two counts of manslaughter. 12 The court
sentenced him to five years imprisonment and placed him in a
psychiatric institution for a two-year period commencing on July 3,
1991.13 On May 17, 1993, the public prosecutor prepared a request
for a one-year extension of the applicant’s placement. 14 The
applicant was also informed of this request. 15 However, the
prosecutor’s request did not arrive to the registry of the Regional
Court; instead, it was accidentally placed in the court’s archives.16
8

See Erkalo v. The Netherlands, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1998), http://www.echr.coe.int; Schönbrod v. Germany,
App. No. 48038/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://www.echr.coe.int;
Rutten v. The Netherlands, App. No. 32605/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001),
http://www.echr.coe.int; Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, App. No.
6301/73 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1979), http://www.echr.coe.int.
9
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 68.
10
Id. ¶ 73.
11
Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1998).
12
Id. ¶ 9.
13
Id. ¶ 10.
14
Id. ¶ 12.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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Because of the filing error, the Regional Court did not receive
the public prosecutor’s request for the extension of the placement
order “until two months after the expiration of the statutory period,
and, as a result, for eighty-two days, the placement of the applicant
was not based on any judicial decision.”17
The Court also observed that that there was a lack of
adequate safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.18 This was evidenced
by the fact that it was the “applicant’s own initiative that set in
motion the judicial proceedings.”19
For these reasons the Court concluded that the “detention of
the applicant between the date of the expiry of the initial placement
order and the date on which the Regional Court rendered its
decision,” was not compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention, and thus it was unlawful.20
The Erkalo case shares some important similarities with the
present case. For instance, like the applicant in Erkalo, the applicant
in the present case also took the initiative by asking authorities about
the progress of the review proceedings for his preventive detention.21
Thus, the applicant had nothing to do with the delay of his case
review.22 This suggests that the second factor, namely, whether there
had been adequate safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release
from detention would not be unreasonable delayed, should be
weighed in the applicant’s favor. Indeed, it was not the applicant’s
fault, but rather, the public prosecutor’s error that caused the delay of
the review proceedings.23

17

Id. ¶ 57.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. ¶ 60.
21
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 85.
22
Id.
23
Id. ¶ 87.
18
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However, unlike the applicant in Erkalo the applicant here
was only placed in detention for an additional 27 days.24 In contrast,
the applicant in Erkalo was placed in detention for an additional 82
days.25 That is over three times the length that the applicant in the
present case was detained. Thus, even if, for arguments sake,
adequate safeguards were not in place to ensure that the applicant’s
release from detention would not be unreasonably delayed, the length
of the applicant’s stay in this case was much shorter than the
applicant in Erkalo.
C. Schönbrod v. Germany
Similarly, the applicant in Schönbrod v. Germany had his
review proceedings delayed by about nine and a half months.26 The
applicant in Schönbrod had a long history of convictions ranging
from theft to aggravated armed robbery.27 On May 20, 1996, three
years after being released from jail, the applicant was arrested again
and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.28 The applicant was set to
complete his preventive detention on June 7, 2005, but his detention
was not reviewed until March 30, 2006 – a delay of nine and a half
months.29
The Court observed that a delay of nine and a half months
was a “considerable time” for the applicant to be in detention without
the necessary court order. 30 The Court also noted that “nothing
indicate[d] that the applicant contributed in any way to the delays
caused in the procedure.”31 Quite the contrary, the Court found that
24

Id. ¶ 27.
Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57 9Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
26
Schönbrod, App. No. 48038/06, ¶ 103.
27
Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
28
Id. ¶ 16.
29
Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
30
Id. ¶ 78.
31
Id. ¶ 107.
25
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while the Regional Court had already initiated the proceedings at
issue nine months before the end of the applicant’s prison sentence,
the proceedings were subsequently delayed for several reasons.32
One of these reasons was that the public prosecutor’s office took six
months to send the case file to the Regional Court. 33 For these
reasons, the Court held that the applicant’s detention was arbitrary
and thus unlawful for purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.34
Like Erkalo, Schönbrod also has many similarities with the
present case. For instance, like the applicant in Schönbrod, the
applicant in this case had nothing to do with the delays caused in the
review proceedings.35 Moreover, like both Erkalo and Schönbrod,
the public prosecutor’s mistakes caused the delay in the applicant’s
detention review. 36 However, there is a staggering difference
between the present case and Schönbrod in that the applicant in
Schönbrod had his review proceedings delayed by nine and a half
months compared to only twenty-seven days in the present case.37
C. Rutten v. The Netherlands
In contrast, the applicant in Rutten v. The Netherlands had
only experienced a delay of about one month in his review
proceedings. 38 In Rutten, the applicant had been convicted of
attempted homicide and sentenced to eight months imprisonment.39
In addition, “the Court of Appeal imposed a TBS order (similar to

32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 85.
36
Id. ¶ 87.
37
Id. ¶ 27.
38
Rutten v. Netherlands, App. No. 32605/96, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2001).
39
Id. ¶ 9.
33
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preventive detention) with confinement to a secure institution.”40 The
“TBS order took effect on September 4, 1992 and expired two years
later on September 4, 1994.”41 On September 9, 1994, “the Regional
Court prolonged the TBS order by one year, now set to expire on
September 4, 1995.” 42 On July 18, 1995, “the public prosecutor
requested that the TBS be further prolonged based on the advice of
the secure institution where the applicant was being held.”43
The Regional Court examined the prosecutor’s request in a
hearing held on September 22, 1995.44 The applicant “argued that the
prolongation should be inadmissible because the TBS order had
expired on September 4, 1995.”45 On October 6, 1995, the Regional
Court rejected the applicant’s argument and prolonged his TBS order
for an additional year.46
In its analysis, the Court observed that the “prosecutor’s
request was filed within the statutory time limit and the applicant
was informed on July 28, 1995 that the Regional Court would
consider the request for a prolongation of the order at the hearing on
September 22, 1995.”47 However, it was only at the actual hearing on
September 22, 1995 that the applicant expressed objections against
the delay in the examination of the review proceedings.48 Based on
these facts, the Court held that the “applicant’s detention between the
expiry of his TBS order and the determination of the Regional Court
of the request for the prolongation” could not be regarded as
involving an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.49
40

Id.
Id.
42
Id. ¶ 10.
43
Id. ¶ 11.
44
Id. ¶ 12.
45
Id.
46
Id. ¶ 13.
47
Id. ¶45.
48
Id.
49
Id. ¶ 46.
41
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In the present case, the Court distinguished Rutten. 50 It
pointed out that “unlike the applicant in the present case, the
applicant in the case of Rutten could be considered to have accepted
the foreseeable delay in the examination of his case by domestic
courts” because he never objected to it.51 Although this is in fact
true, it only supports a finding that one of the factors, namely,
whether the applicant objected to a foreseeable delay in the
proceedings, should be weighed in the applicant’s favor. Moreover,
although the Court stated that the present case can be distinguished
from Rutten in “several respects,” the Court only listed the one
mentioned above.52 Thus, although the applicant in the present case
was never given prior notice of a delay in his review proceedings,
that factor still does not outweigh the short length that his review
proceedings were delayed, i.e., 27 days.
D. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands
Lastly, in Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, the applicant had
only experienced a delay of about two weeks before his detention
was reviewed.53 On December 16, 1969, “the Regional Court made
an order authorizing the prolongation of the detention of the
applicant by one year.” 54 On December 14, 1970, “the public
prosecutor at ‘s-Hertogenbosch requested the renewal of the
detention order for a further year, on the basis of the monthly records
of the doctors who had successively treated Mr. Winterwerp.”55 On
January 7, 1971, two weeks after the previous order expired, the
Regional Court authorized further detention for another year.56
50

H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 84.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Winterwerp, App. No. 6301/73, ¶ 49.
54
Id. ¶ 26.
55
Id. ¶ 27.
56
Id.
51
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The applicant argued that “his confinement became unlawful
insofar as it continued beyond the term fixed.”57 The government
responded that under the Mentally Ill Persons Act, the important date
is not when the Regional Court gave its ruling, but when the public
prosecutor filed his request.58 Thus, because the public prosecutor
had filed his request within the permitted period required by
domestic law, his conduct was not unreasonable or unlawful.59 The
Court agreed with the government. 60 The Court held that the
“interval of two weeks between the expiry of the earlier order and the
making of the succeeding renewal order can in no way be regarded
as unreasonable or excessive.”61
Just like in Winterwerp, the present case complied with
domestic law.62 In the present case, the threshold applied by the
domestic courts, which examined whether the procedure followed in
the proceedings disclosed a “flagrant irregularity,”63 was proper and
consistent with case law.64 Indeed, the Court admits “the applicant’s
preventive detention after [December 24 2009] remained lawful
under domestic law.” 65 Moreover, this finding shows that the
domestic courts did have adequate safeguards in place to ensure that
applicant’s release from detention would not be unreasonably
delayed. Indeed, under domestic law, the applicant would have been
deprived of his liberty if the procedure followed had “unjustifiable
disrespected Article 67e of the Criminal Code.”66 Of course, since
the delay in this present case was caused by an accident and not
57

Id. ¶ 49.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 90.
63
Id. ¶ 89.
64
Id. ¶ 90.
65
Id.
66
Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
58
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some “flagrant irregularity,” the applicant’s liberty interests were not
violated.67
After a closer analysis of the four cases cited by the Court in
support of its first holding, I disagree with its conclusion.
First, the Court did not give enough weight to the first factor,
namely, the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a
detention order that had either expired or had been found defective.
As evidenced in Erkalo and Schönbrod, a delay in the review
proceedings of a person’s preventive detention, for purposes of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, should be considered arbitrary if the
delay is at least eighty-two days68 and certainly if the delay is over
nine months.69 However, in this case, the applicant’s delay was for
only twenty-seven days.70 Thus, this case is closer to the facts in
Winterwerp and Rutten, where the Court held that delays of one
month71 and two weeks,72 respectively, were not long enough to be
deemed arbitrary and thus unlawful for purposes of Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention.
Secdon, the Court did not give sufficient deference to the
domestic courts holding that the Regional Court had not unjustifiably
disrespected the said provision of the Criminal Code, which
safeguarded the constitutional right to liberty.73 Put another way,
“[t]he procedure followed did not disclose a flagrant irregularity.”74
Instead, the Court insisted that there were no “sufficiently clear
safeguards to ensure that a decision on the applicant’s release from
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.”75 However, this is not
67

Id. ¶ 31.
Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57.
69
Schönbrod, App. No. 48038/06, ¶ 103.
70
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 27.
71
Rutten, App. No. 32605/96, ¶ 54.
72
Winterwerp, App. No. 6301/73, ¶ 49.
73
H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 32.
74
Id. ¶ 31.
75
Id. ¶ 89.
68
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true. The domestic courts could not be any clearer in providing a
safeguard to the constitutional right to liberty: there must be a
flagrant irregularity in the procedure to find a violation of a right to
liberty.76
Nevertheless, the Court stated that the “flagrant irregularity”
threshold used by the domestic courts “was too high and thus failed
to afford the applicant sufficient protection from excessive delays.”77
What the Court essentially asserted, therefore, is that any mistake or
accident that delays an applicant’s detention review (all other factors
being considered) by at least one month is unlawful. This to me is
too extreme of a conclusion. No constitutional right to liberty has
been violated where the duration of the delay in reviewing the
person’s detention is minimal and there is, in fact, already adequate
safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from detention
would not be unreasonably delayed. For these reasons, I would reach
the opposite conclusion and hold that the delay in the review of the
applicant’s detention did not violate Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
E. Revisiting Dörr v. Germany
As to the second issue, the Court held that “by failing to – at
least attempt to – obtain fresh advice from an external medical expert
on the necessity of the applicant’s continuing preventive detention,”
there has been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention.78 I agree
with this conclusion although an analysis of Dörr v. Germany, App.
No. 2894/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) demonstrates this to be a close
decision.
In Dörr, the applicant was convicted of two counts of rape
and one count of attempted rape and bodily assault.79 The court
76
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sentenced him to ten years imprisonment and ordered his preventive
detention.80 On January 19, 1999, the applicant completed his prison
sentence.81 However, because he was still deemed a threat to the
public, he remained in preventive detention.82
One of the applicant’s arguments was that the preventive
detention “had been based on old and insufficient expert opinion and
an insufficient establishment of the facts concerning his
dangerousness, which made the proceedings against him unfair.”83
Specifically, although the applicant’s detention was reviewed
in 2007, the review relied on an analysis made by an external
psychiatric expert in 2001.84 Moreover, other expert reports from
1999 and 2001 referenced the applicant’s personality.85 Thus, a six to
eight year gap existed between the psychiatric experts’ reports and
the applicant’s detention review.86
However, the Court in Dörr pointed out that what was relied
upon in the reports “was the fact that the applicant’s dangerousness
resulted from the fact that he had refused all offers of therapy made
to him throughout the execution of his penalty and had not yet
reflected on his offenses.”87 Moreover, the “applicant had failed to
substantiate that there had been any substantial changes to his
personality or attitude towards his offenses since his last examination
by an expert.” 88 For these and other similar reasons, the Court
concluded that its “decision not to release the applicant had not been
based on an assessment of his dangerousness that was unreasonable
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in terms of the objectives of the judgment of the sentencing court to
protect the public from significant sexual offenses.”89
Like the applicant in Dörr, the applicant in the present case
was a sexual offender that was placed in preventive detention
because he posed a threat to the public. 90 In addition, like the
applicant in Dörr, the applicant here also “had not reflected on his
offenses and had not made any therapy.” 91 However, unlike the
applicant in Dörr, the facts in the present case indicate that the
applicant was “not entirely unwilling to undergo therapy.” 92 The
applicant in the present case explained that he would “be willing to
work with a therapist he could trust.”93
In addition, the length of time between the applicant’s
psychiatric expert report and the review of his detention was twelve
and a half years.94 Indeed, this is significantly longer than the six or
eight-year gap in Dörr.95 The Court, thus, appropriately puts a lot of
emphasis on the twelve-and-a-half-year gap.96
Although this is a close decision, the Court’s holding was
proper. Despite its similarities with Dörr, including the applicant’s
failure to reflect on his offenses or go to therapy,97 the differences in
this case are significant. Most notably, the applicant in the present
case had not received a psychiatric evaluation in twelve and a half
years.98 Moreover, the facts indicate that unlike Dörr, the applicant
here was “not entirely unwilling to undergo therapy.”99 For these
89
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reasons, failure to obtain a new psychiatric report violated the
applicant’s liberty interests under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that the applicant’s rights had been violated
pursuant to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention because: (1) the domestic
courts failure to comply with the statutory time limit for review of
the necessity of the applicant’s preventive detention; and (2) the
domestic courts’ refusal to consult a medical expert on the
applicant’s dangerousness to the public.

